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Abstract Negotiation processes involve a substantive, a communication, and an emo-
tional dimension. These dimensions have been analyzed mainly in isolation of each
other.We introduce an approach to consider all three dimensions and present an empir-
ical study on the relations between these dimensions. Results indicate a strong linkage
between communication behavior and emotions, while connections to the substantive
dimension of the negotiation process are weaker.
Keywords Negotiation · Process · Utility · Communication · Emotions
1 Introduction
Negotiations can be analyzed from many different perspectives (Koeszegi and
Vetschera 2010; Vetschera 2013). Over the last decades, two main streams of research
on negotiations have emerged. One is mainly concerned with the substantive side of
A previous version of this paper was presented at the Joint International Conference of the INFORMS
GDN Section and the EUROWorking Group on DSS on Group Decision and Negotiation 2014, Toulouse,







1 Institute of Management Science, Vienna University of Technology, Wien, Austria
2 Department of Business Administration, University of Vienna, Wien, Austria
123
1170 M. Filzmoser et al.
negotiations. This stream can be exemplified by the concept of negotiation analy-
sis (Raiffa 1982; Sebenius 1992). It views a negotiation mainly as a sequence of
offers and counteroffers and is predominantly concerned with economic criteria like
efficiency and utilities of parties.
In parallel, a more behaviorally oriented stream has emerged, which emphasizes
the role of communication in negotiations (Holmes 1992). Researchers in this domain
have developed classification schemes for communication acts (Olekalns et al. 2003)
and phase models of negotiations (Adair and Brett 2005), which explain how commu-
nication content changes over time and influences the outcomes of negotiations. The
main outcome considered in this stream is whether a negotiation reaches an agreement
at all.
More recently, researchers have begun to consider emotions as yet another dimen-
sion of negotiations (Bazerman et al. 2000; Butt et al. 2005; Griessmair and Koeszegi
2009). This research has uncovered different emotional patterns in negotiations and
thus has contributed to our understanding how emotions shape processes and outcomes
of negotiations.
However, the relations between these three dimensions have only rarely been stud-
ied. With few exceptions (e.g., Overbeck et al. 2010), the emotional dimension so
far has been studied mostly in isolation. Analyses of the substantive dimension often
ignore the content of communication other than offers. Studies that focus on communi-
cation consider emotional or substantive content similarly to any other type of content.
Emotions are represented by broad categories like “affective persuasion” (Adair and
Brett 2005), substantive offers are sometimes distinguished and classified into “single-
issue offer”, “multi-issue offer” (Adair and Brett 2005; Olekalns and Smith 2003), or
“concession” (Olekalns et al. 2003;Olekalns and Smith 2003), butwithout considering
actual values.
In the present paper, we propose to analyze negotiation processes in the unified
framework illustrated inFig. 1.Weviewnegotiationprocesses as three parallel streams,
which evolve over time. The main focus of the present paper is on the relationship
between these dimensions.
Since we are trying to integrate dimensions, which so far were analyzed in quite
different streams of literature, our work is necessarily explorative. There are not many
established theories that allow us to formulate hypotheses about the relationships
between dimensions based on strong theory that covers all three dimensions of the
negotiation process. To study such relationships, one needs to identify a “common
ground” in the theoretical and empirical work dealing with these dimensions. Such a
commonground could be found either in the outcomes of negotiations, or in negotiation
processes.
Research on all three dimensions is concerned with their effects on outcomes, and
one can identify effects which lead to similar outcomes. For example, concessions at
the substantive level (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992), communication aimed at creating
value (Olekalns and Smith 2000), and positive emotions (Brett et al. 2007) all have
positive effects on reaching an agreement. However, it would be far-fetched to assume
that behavior leading to similar outcomes necessarily occurs together.Whether actions
at the different dimensions are substitutes or complements, and how consistency across
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Fig. 1 Issue-communication-emotions (ICE) framework for negotiation processes
dimensions affects outcomes, is an important question for amultidimensional perspec-
tive of negotiation research.
We thus focus on the process perspective as a common ground between dimensions.
This requires a unified framework for negotiation processes, which maps events in
the different dimensions onto a common time scale. This time scale must also be
comparable across negotiations for data aggregation and statistical analysis. In the
present paper,we apply the standardized interpolated path analysis (SIPA) ofVetschera
and Filzmoser (2012) to create such a common time scale. We develop a framework of
the different dimensions of negotiation processes and their relationships and illustrate
the potential of this framework by an exploratory study using existing data.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 gives a brief overview
of the SIPA approach as well as the methods employed tomeasure the different dimen-
sions of negotiations. In Sect. 3, we review existing literature on possible relationships
between the three dimensions and derive hypotheses for our study. In Sect. 4, we
present some exemplary results and Sect. 5 evaluates the outcomes of this study and
provides directions for future research.
2 Methods
We apply the SIPA method (Vetschera and Filzmoser 2012) to create a common
representation of negotiation processes in all three dimensions considered. SIPAmaps
negotiations, in which a variable number of offers and messages are exchanged at
varying points in time, onto a common time scale and a common set of measurement
points. Each offer or message in a negotiation is considered as one observation of
a continuous time process (Balakrishnan and Eliashberg 1995). Linear interpolation
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Fig. 2 Illustration of the SIPA method
between observations is used to approximate values at fixed points in time, e.g., each
quarter of the negotiation.
The main ideas of SIPA are represented graphically in Fig. 2. We explain the
approach for the offer process in terms of utilities, but the same concept can also be
applied to the other dimensions. A negotiation consists of several offers i = 1, . . . Nn ,
where the total number Nn of offers in a negotiation might vary from negotiation to
negotiation. The time at which offer i is made is denoted by si . At points in time
si the actual observations of the variables of interest can be made (for example, the
utility values of actual offers can be calculated from issue values). For this exposition,
we consider only one variable v that is measured for each offer. The approach can
of course be applied to any number of variables (like the utilities which an offer
provides to both sides of the negotiation etc.), and we use it for different variables in
each dimension in the following empirical study. Let v(si ) be the value of variable v
observed in offer i at time si . Furthermore, let T = {t1, . . . , tn} be a set of fixed points
in time, themeasurement points. For example, t1, t2, t3, and t4 could denote the end of
each quarter of a negotiation. The value of variable v at time t j is linearly interpolated








Note that i− = i+ in case that one observation occurs exactly at time t j . In Fig. 2, for
example, the very last offer also marks the end of the negotiation and thus coincides
with the end of the fourth quarter of the negotiation.
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The value v(t j ) at time t j is then calculated by linear interpolation as
v(t j ) = si+ − t j
si+ − si− v(si
−) + t j − si−
si+ − si− v(si
+) (3)
The common set of measurement points t j creates a standardized representation of
an offer process across negotiations that might contain a varying number of offers, and
in which individual offers are made at different points in time. Compared to the more
common approach of forming averages across offers contained e.g. in each quarter of
a negotiation, SIPA in our view provides several advantages:
– SIPA is independent of the number and temporal distribution of actual observa-
tions. For example, in Fig. 2, the third quarter of the negotiation does not contain
any actual offer, but still a value can be interpolated for time t3.
– Averaging throughout an entire quarter (or some other fraction) of the negotiation
might dampen trends and thus the dynamics of the negotiation, which are still
discernible in the interpolated path.
– Compared to a discrete event approach, inwhich the value of the system is assumed
to remain constant between observations, an interpolation approach is less sensitive
to the actual timing of observations. In a discrete event approach, if an observa-
tion is made briefly before a measurement point, the value of that observation is
assigned to the measurement point. If the same observation occurred just after the
measurement point, the measurement point would still receive the value of the
previous observation, which could be drastically different. In contrast, in an inter-
polation approach, the value assigned to the measurement point is always close to
the actual observation made near the measurement point.
For further details on the SIPA method, its advantages and disadvantages, we refer
to Vetschera and Filzmoser (2012). The remainder of this section explains how SIPA
can be applied to all dimensions of the negotiation process.
On the substantive dimension utilities of offers are of interest. The negotiation
support systems (NSS) Negoisst Schoop et al. (2003), used to conduct the exper-






where u(x) is the utility of offer x, K is the number of issues, uk(.) is the partial utility
function for issue k, and wk is the weight representing the importance of the issue to
the negotiator.
We denote the negotiators by A and B. The utility which an offer proposed by A at
time t j provides to B is denoted by u
t j
B,A, and utility of the same offer to A by u
t j
A,A.
By combining utility values of both parties we define joint utility (Tripp and Sondak
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The content of communication between the negotiators can be transformed into
quantitative data by content analysis. A five step approach proposed by Srnka and
Koeszegi (2007) was applied. Material sourcing and transcription were automatically
performed by the Negoisst system, which stored all exchanged messages. The
subsequent steps of unitization, categorization and coding were performed by trained
coders.
The category scheme of content categories varies between studies due to different
research questions addressed. For the purpose of this study, we applied the broad clas-
sification of Olekalns et al. (2003), who categorize content in negotiations according
to strategic orientation (distributive or integrative) and strategic function (informa-
tion or action). This results in four content categories: (i) distributive information, (ii)
integrative information, (iii) claiming value, and (iv) creating value, which then were
interpolated to quarters of each negotiation using SIPA.
Our measurement of emotions uses entire messages sent by negotiators as units of
analysis. In such a setting, a classification of emotions into pre-defined categories is
disadvised (Frijda 2009) in favor of less constrained approaches (Cowie and Cornelius
2003). We conceptualize and measure emotions following the dimensional perspec-
tive of emotions (Burgoon and Hale 1984), in particular the circumplex model of
affect (Russell 1980; Russell and Barrett 1999). The basic assumption of this model
is that all emotions and emotion-related states can be described by two underlying
bipolar dimensions (Barrett 2004): valence (positive vs. negative emotions), and acti-
vation (high vs. low). In contrast to appraisal theories (e.g., Lazarus 2001) interlinking
emotions with specific context appraisals, a dimensional model of emotions is not
based on a prespecified taxonomy. Put differently, a dimensional perspective of emo-
tions does not primarily seek to distinguish discrete categories, but follows a more
holistic approach. Nevertheless, any discrete emotion (e.g., anger) can be defined and
identified by its position in relation to the two affective dimensions (Feldman 1995)
of valence and activation, as these span a two-dimensional Cartesian space. Conse-
quently, the discrete emotion of anger would fall in between the negative pole of the
valence dimension and the high activation pole of the activation dimension. The emo-
tional dimensions of valence and activation are further shown to be highly robust,
emerging ”whenever individuals label or communicate their own or others’ affective
experiences” (Barrett and Fossum 2001, p. 334).
To measure these two dimensions of emotions, Multidimensional Scaling (MDS)
(Torgerson 1952) was successfully employed in literature (e.g., Barrett 2004; Griess-
mair and Koeszegi 2009). MDS relies on judgments of similarity or proximity and
delivers a spatial representation of the gathered proximity data in an n-dimensional
space. The decision of the ’best fitting’ number of dimensions is to be based on a
goodness-of-fit measure (i.e., Stress) as well as the interpretability of the obtained
solution. In the present study this resulted in two dimensions (i.e., valence and acti-
vation). The dimensions resulting from MDS are metric variables, which then can be
interpolated to quarters of each negotiation using SIPA.
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3 State-of-the-Art and Hypotheses
3.1 Communication and Substantive Dimension
Economics and game theory often consider communication in joint decision making
as cheap talk, which does not directly affect outcomes. However, communication
in negotiations can be used to exchange information, threats, etc., which can have a
substantive influence on outcomes (Olekalns et al. 1996;Weingart et al. 1999;Olekalns
and Smith 2000, 2003; Adair and Brett 2005).
Previous studies indicate that joint gains require sharing information about pref-
erences and priorities, i.e. integrative information exchange (Weingart et al. 1999;
Olekalns and Smith 2000, 2003; Adair and Brett 2005). Such information allows
value-creating concessions and trade-offs resulting in win-win offers (Hyder et al.
2000; Olekalns and Smith 2003). Value creating and problem solving behavior, which
considers the opponent’s outcomes (Pruitt 1981; Pruitt and Rubin 1986), also requires
such information exchange. This behavior increases joint utility (Hyder et al. 2000)
and decreases utility imbalance.
In contrast, positional bargaining (Fisher and Ury 1981), claiming value, defying
concessions, and similar behavior increases the risk of inferior results (Olekalns and
Smith 2003). Theory and evidence suggest that negotiators who frequently use com-
petitive strategies such as demands or threats fail to reach satisfactory outcomes (Lewis
and Fry 1977; Schulz and Pruitt 1978; Putnam and Jones 1982; Donohue et al. 1984;
Olekalns and Smith 2000). According to the dual concern model (Pruitt 1981; Pruitt
and Rubin 1986), an exclusive focus on self concern will lead to win-lose situations
and thus outcomes characterized by inefficiency (Hyder et al. 2000) and unfairness.
We therefore hypothesize for the relation between the communication and the sub-
stantive dimension:
H1a An integrative orientation in communication—i.e. providing integrative
information and creating value—is positively related to joint utility and nega-
tively to utility imbalance.
H1b A distributive orientation in communication—i.e. distributive information
and claiming value—is negatively related to joint utility and positively to utility
imbalance.
3.2 Emotional and Substantive Dimension
By communicating with each other, the negotiators enact a social context, also giv-
ing rise to emotions (Barry and Oliver 1996). Emotions are thus always present
in social interactions and might have a constant impact on negotiation behav-
ior and communication. Emotions influence cognitive processes (Lazarus 2001) as
well as behaviors (Frijda et al. 1989). Thus, emotions “color” the decision making
process (Damasio 1994) and provide meaning regarding a negotiator’s own (Schwarz
1990) as well as the opponent’s (Kleef 2009) actions. Consequently, emotions are
argued to be central to behavior and communication (Morris and Keltner 2000).
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This interrelation can, for example, be explained by Face Theory (Goffman 1967).
Attacking face refers to competitive behaviors accompanied by negative emotions,
whereas giving face refers to cooperative behaviors accompanied by positive emo-
tions (Brett et al. 2007).AttributionTheory (Weiner 1985) similarly posits that negative
emotions are, for example, related to resolute behavior, whereas positive emotions are
related to flexibility (Cheshin et al. 2011). Communication and behavior driving the
negotiation process consist of multiple layers of meaning transporting different slices
of information (Griessmair and Koeszegi 2009), which together comprise the overall
“informativeness of a message” (Sokolova and Lapalme 2012, p. 366). Consequently,
communication and behavior are not either fact-based or emotional, but both to differ-
ent extents. Moreover, since emotions, communication, and behavior are interrelated
in a complex manner, they constantly influence each other (Barry and Oliver 1996).
Considering the two dimensions of the circumplex model of affect, activation
implies commitment (Rogan and Hammer 1995) or readiness for action (Frijda et al.
1989). Thus it is an indicator for the importance of an issue (Marinier et al. 2009). A
higher degree of activation implies that negotiators are more engaged in the achieve-
ment of a goal (Weiss and Cropanzano 1996). Additionally, activation increases with
uncertainty or task difficulty (cf. Klein and Beith 1985). Consequently, higher degrees
of activation indicate higher cognitive involvement and more active engagement in
the negotiation (Lewis et al. 1984). This is particularly likely if something is at stake,
or becomes more pressing and important. Since a low joint utility, or a high utility
imbalance require action to resolve differences, it can be expected that such situations
co-vary with higher activation.
In the light of negative emotions, negotiators make smaller concessions (Kleef
et al. 2004), behave more defensive or distrusting (Morris and Keltner 2000), reject
offers more frequently (Pillutla and Murnighan 1996), and reach lower joint gains
(Allred et al. 1997). If negotiators attribute negative emotions to unfairness, the result
is a tendency to “punish” the opponent (e.g., Moretti and Pellegrino 2010). Hence,
emotions are also evaluations of—the fairness of—offers. In a similar vein, positive
emotions can be expected to infuse the offer process positively. Research supports this
claim with evidence indicating that positive emotions are interrelated with an increase
in joint gains (Carnevale and Isen 1986) or concessions (Baron 1990).
For the relation between the emotion and the substantive dimension we, therefore,
hypothesize
H2a Activation is negatively related to the joint utility and positively to utility
imbalance.
H2b Positive emotions are positively related to the joint utility, whereas negative
emotions are positively related to utility imbalance.
3.3 Communication and Emotion Dimension
Activation indicates commitment or engagement (Bodtker and Jameson 2001). Hence,
activation can be expected to co-vary with competitive or distributive behaviors
(Barsade 2002) because more activated emotions are noticed more quickly and eas-
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ily (Maitlis and Ozcelik 2004), and may thus increase when something needs to be
resolved. Moreover, studies on language intensity (e.g., Taylor and Donald 2004) indi-
cate that higher degrees of activation are characteristic for emphasizing or addressing
specific concerns, as well as threatening, insulting, or apologizing behaviors. Lower
degrees of activation occur when addressing many issues in a less focused manner, as
well as in information sharing.
With respect to negative emotions, empirical evidence generally shows that anger
and competitive, or distributive behaviors are interrelated (Liu 2009; Kleef et al. 2004).
Anger canbeused to assert one’s position, or to signal toughness (Kleef et al. 2004), and
was also found to increase risk tolerance (Lerner and Keltner 2001). Moreover, anger
and value claiming are positively related (Overbeck et al. 2010). Positive emotions,
such as happiness, are generally interlinked with cooperative, or integrative behaviors
(Barsade 2002; Carnevale and Isen 1986). For instance, positive emotions coincide
with pro-social (Batson et al. 1979), or trusting behaviors (Morris and Keltner 2000).
Additionally, positive emotions are positively related to flexibility (Druckman and
Broome 1991), or creativity and problem solving behaviors (Isen et al. 1987). In the
light of positive emotions, negotiators are also more likely to signal their willingness
for cooperation (Kleef et al. 2004).
For the interrelation between the emotion and the communication dimension we,
therefore, hypothesize
H3aActivation is positively related to a distributive orientation in communicati-
on—i.e. value claiming and distributive information—, and negatively to an
integrative orientation in communication—i.e. value creation and integrative
information.
H3b Positive emotions are positively related to an integrative orientation in
communication—i.e. value creating and integrative information—,whereas neg-
ative emotions are positively related to adistributive orientation in communication—
i.e. value claiming and distributive information.
4 Empirical Study
4.1 Experiment
For our analyses, we used data from a previous negotiation experiment conducted with
the NSS Negoisst (Schoop et al. 2003). Negoisst is a web-based system that
offers decision and communication support to negotiators. Decision support is pro-
vided by eliciting an additive multi-attributive utility function and presenting utilities
of offers in graphical and tabular form. Communication support is provided by the
system at the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic levels. At the syntactic level, specific
types of messages can be identified. The exchange of messages follows an alternating
negotiation protocol, e.g. a question has to be followed by a clarification or an offer
by either a counter-offer or acceptance. The system allows to link the natural language
messages to issue values via semantic enrichment. At the pragmatic level, the system
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distinguishes between formal and informal communication. The system records all
offers and messages, which build the basis for our analyses.
The experiment was conducted as part of a larger study comparing behavioral and
economic negotiation support (Gettinger et al. 2012). A total of 234 students—i.e. 117
dyads—from four European universities participated in this experiment. Participants
represented either a Western European or an Eastern European company in bilateral
joint venture negotiations. The case contained seven issues with continuous or discrete
options. It was thus quite complex and designed to induce a high level of conflict, as
it contained only narrow zones of possible agreement. The preferences of the parties
were provided in the form of private information about issue weights and reservation
levels, as well as utility schemes for each issue. To avoid information spill-overs, all
participants from the same university were assigned to the same role.
Participants first received training on the system, then information about demo-
graphics, language and negotiation skills was collected via a pre-negotiation ques-
tionnaire. After completing the questionnaire, participants had two weeks to complete
the negotiations. The case indicated the existence of outside options to explicitly allow
negotiations to fail. After the twoweek period, participants received a post-negotiation
questionnaire concerning their satisfaction with the negotiation process and outcome.
The experiment was part of the course requirements in international negotiation
courses provided at the four participating universities. Subjects were rewarded for
participating in the experiment by course credits, independently of the outcomes they
reached.
4.2 Measurement and Descriptive Statistics
The utility values calculated and stored by Negoisstwere directly used for analyses
of the substantive dimension. We applied the SIPA method outlined in Sect. 2 to
interpolate the utility values of offers from both sides at the end of each quarter of the
negotiations. From these values, we calculated joint utility and utility imbalance for
both parties, which were then averaged across parties.
Content analysis of the 1489 messages exchanged during the experiment was per-
formed by seven trained coders. The first step performed by the coders was to separate
messages into thought units. Reliability of this step was evaluated by Guetzkow’s U
(Holsti 1969). With values ranging from 0.001 to 0.022 for the seven coder teams and
their respective subsets of data, satisfactory consistency was achieved (Simons 1993).
Remaining inconsistencies were discussed and resolved by the coders. This resulted
in a data set of 24,311 thought units.
The category scheme used for the actual coding of thought units was developed via
a deductive-inductive procedure (Srnka and Koeszegi 2007). Starting from Walcott’s
“Bargaining Process Analysis II” scheme (Putnam and Jones 1982), categories were
inductively added or deleted based on the analyzed content. The coders then individu-
ally assigned each thought unit to one of the eleven main categories shown in Table 1.
To evaluate the reliability of coding, Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen 1960) was calculated.
The values obtained were in the range from 0.808 to 0.972 and thus well above the
acceptability threshold 0.8or 0.7 for exploratory studies (Lombard et al. 2002). Finally,
coders discussed inconsistencies and agreed on one category for each thought unit.
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Priority information Ask or provide information about priorities and aspiration
levels
Distributive info
Positional information Provision of facts or statements to underline the negotiator’s
position and persuade
Creating value
Make concession Making or offering an unconditional or conditional
(log-rolling) concession
Social relationship statements that constitute empathic communication
(expressing concern, emotions, trust)
Claiming value
Positional offer Positional or bottom-line offers and value claiming
Request concession Requesting concessions from the opponent
Negative response Rejection of proposals and expression of negative emotions
Tactics Use tactics (pressure, promises, authority), requesting offers
and providing incorrect information
Substantiate position Normative statements referring to fairness, requesting
understanding, etc.
Other
Negotiation process Communication related to the negotiation process like
address, closing or signature, time planning
Negotiation system Communication concerning the negotiation support system
and its functionalities
For the purpose of this study, the resulting categories were further aggregated into
the four main communication categories of negotiations proposed by Olekalns et al.
(2003) as shown in Table 1. Categories referring to the negotiation process and system
were not used in the subsequent analysis. We then used the relative share of each of
these aggregated categories in each message as a state variable and applied the SIPA
approach to interpolate the communication state of each negotiation at the end of each
quarter.
To measure the emotional content of messages, we employed a three-step MDS-
based procedure. In the first step the input data for the MDS procedure is constructed
by assessing the similarity or proximity of the analyzed stimuli (i.e., entire negotiation
messages). In particular, we had raters judge entire negotiation messages according
to their emotional similarity. To do so we used a minimally constrained free sort-
ing task (e.g., Lawless et al. 1995), which was undertaken by uninvolved—and thus
unbiased—students as raters. Specifically, groups of up to 26 raters each judged the
same subset of negotiation messages according to their similarity. This proceeded as
follows: Raters received work packages including instructions and up to 250messages
printed on single sheets of paper. The raters were instructed to sort these messages into
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decks according to emotional similarity. The number of potential decks was neither
pre-specified nor limited. Proximity of two messages was measured by the number
of raters who assigned them to the same deck. The resulting proximity matrix was
then processed by PERMAP 11.8a (Heady and Lucas 1997). We used nonmetric MDS
with Euclidean distances as distance measures, as this approach is preferable when
analyzing data based on subjective similarity judgments (Bartholomew et al. 2008).
Based on the goodness-of-fit measure (Stress-1) as well as the potential interpretabil-
ity of dimensions, we identified a two-dimensional solution. Stress-1 for this solution
was 0.05. Consequently, we obtained a representation in two-dimensional Cartesian
space, which was finally rotated such that the two axes reflect the two dimensions
of valence and activation. As such our MDS results are in accord with the circum-
plex model of affect (Russell 1980; Russell and Barrett 1999), and the emotional
dimensions can thus be interpreted concordantly. The two variables (i.e., emotional
dimensions) were then also interpolated at the end points of each quarter of the nego-
tiations.
Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics for the measures of all three dimensions
at the end of each quarter of the negotiations.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Substantive and Communication Dimension
To test our hypotheses, we used correlation analysis. We consider the negotiation
process to consist of three streams, but we do not assume that there is a hierar-
chy between these streams, or that there exist clear causal relationships between the
dimensions. Thus, models assuming a causal relationship between variables would be
inadequate. We calculate correlation coefficients between variables across dimensions
at the same points in time within the negotiation. We thus focus on the relationship
between the dimensions, and not on the dynamics within each dimension.
Hypotheses H1a and H1b referred to the relationship between substantive and com-
munication dimensions. Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients between joint utility
and contract imbalance on the one hand, and the usage of the four communication cat-
egories on the other hand. These results provide only weak evidence in support of
H1. We find a significant, but not strong, positive correlation between value creation
and joint utility in the two middle quarters of negotiations, and the expected neg-
ative correlation to utility imbalance in the second and fourth quarters. Contrary to
expectations, the only significant correlation of integrative information to joint utility is
negative. As expected, there is a positive relationship between distributive information
and contract imbalance in some quarters, and a negative relationship with integrative
information.
Joint utility is an accumulated value resulting from all concessions up to the point at
which it is measured.We therefore also calculated the correlation coefficients between
value creation within each quarter of the negotiation—i.e. joint utility at the end minus
at the beginning of each quarter—and the four communication categories. In that
analysis, we found no significant correlations.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of
all dimensions
Progress 25% 50% 75% 100%
Substantive measures
Joint utility
Mean 1.0568 1.0741 1.0852 1.0572
Median 1.0507 1.0672 1.0843 1.0500
SD 0.0534 0.0565 0.0553 0.0595
Utility imbalance
Mean 0.6915 0.5288 0.3268 0.1540
Median 0.7324 0.5140 0.2855 0.1500
SD 0.1644 0.1944 0.1874 0.1274
Communication measures
Create value
Mean 0.2197 0.2250 0.2440 0.2942
Median 0.2230 0.2172 0.2390 0.2801
SD 0.0850 0.0809 0.0989 0.1467
Claim value
Mean 0.2348 0.2550 0.2599 0.2215
Median 0.2336 0.2332 0.2492 0.2000
SD 0.0898 0.1033 0.1097 0.1749
Integrative info
Mean 0.0527 0.0576 0.0581 0.0359
Median 0.0400 0.0471 0.0504 0.0000
SD 0.0437 0.0512 0.0487 0.0540
Distributive info
Mean 0.1442 0.1525 0.1176 0.0349
Median 0.1462 0.1599 0.1125 0.0000
SD 0.0800 0.0856 0.0765 0.0558
Emotion measures
Valence
Mean 0.0717 −0.0188 −0.0448 0.0528
Median 0.1168 −0.0165 −0.0360 0.0570
SD 0.1900 0.1757 0.2235 0.2766
Activation
Mean −0.0386 0.0199 0.0389 −0.0036
Median −0.0381 0.0048 0.0213 0.0155
SD 0.1129 0.1322 0.1782 0.2099
4.3.2 Substantive Behavior and Emotions
Hypotheses H2a and H2b postulated a negative relationship between activation and
joint utility, and a positive relationshipwith contract imbalance, aswell as relationships
in the opposite directions for valence. As Table 4 shows, there is only scarce evidence
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Table 3 Correlations between substantive behavior and communication
Progress Joint utility Utility imbalance
25% 50% 75% 100% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Create value 0.006 0.204* 0.249** −0.067 0.044 −0.219* −0.022 −0.260**
Claim value 0.070 −0.145 −0.216* −0.062 0.015 0.119 0.017 0.166◦
Integrative info 0.096 −0.068 −0.230* 0.079 −0.044 0.018 0.136 −0.192*
Distributive info 0.069 0.003 0.033 0.022 −0.118 −0.046 0.287** 0.159◦
*** p < 0.1%, ** p < 1%, * p < 5%, ◦ p < 10%
Table 4 Correlations between substantive behavior and emotions
Progress Joint utility Utility imbalance
25% 50% 75% 100% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Valence −0.215 0.027 0.321* −0.191 0.063 −0.059 −0.109 −0.236◦
Activation 0.132 0.140 −0.077 0.102 −0.238◦ −0.065 0.271* 0.070
*** p < 0.1%, ** p < 1%, * p < 5%, ◦ p < 10%
Table 5 Correlations between communication and emotions
Progress Valence Activation
25% 50% 75% 100% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Create value 0.567*** 0.427** 0.672*** 0.695*** 0.203 −0.132 −0.180 0.068
Claim value −0.442*** −0.620*** −0.553*** −0.463*** −0.044 0.226◦ 0.338* 0.330*
Integrative info −0.187 0.045 −0.154 0.002 0.121 −0.094 0.301* 0.250◦
Distributive info −0.288* 0.065 −0.098 −0.253◦ 0.074 0.169 0.110 0.095
*** p < 0.1%, ** p < 1%, * p < 5%, ◦ p < 10%
for these relationships. Most coefficients are insignificant, we only find one positive
correlation of valance with joint utility, and one of activation with contract imbalance
exceeding the 5% threshold of significance.
4.3.3 Communication and Emotions
Table 5 shows the correlation coefficients between communication categories and the
two emotional subdimensions. With respect to valence, our results provide strong sup-
port for hypothesis H3b. There is a significant correlation between action-oriented
communication and valence in the expected direction: Value creation is strongly
related to positive emotions, value claiming to negative emotions. However, this strong
connection is only observable for strategic action, information exhibits only weak cor-
relations with valence. For activation, the relationship to strategic action postulated in
H3a is much weaker than for valence, although the significant correlations have the
expected sign. Similarly to valence, the relationship to information is even weaker,
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Table 6 Correlations between emotions and own as well as opponent’s communication
Progress Valence Activation
25% 50% 75% 100% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Own communication
Create value 0.533*** 0.367*** 0.569*** 0.616*** 0.178 −0.020 −0.090 −0.086
Claim value −0.339*** −0.480*** −0.506*** −0.433*** −0.064 0.160 0.176 0.299**
Integrative info −0.187* −0.047 −0.201* −0.039 −0.015 0.002 0.245** 0.089
Distributive info −0.258** 0.072 −0.017 −0.218* 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.050
Opponent’s communication
Create value 0.174 0.131 0.330*** 0.212* 0.038 −0.123 −0.158 0.158
Claim value −0.213* −0.311*** −0.209* −0.144 0.018 0.108 0.274** 0.069
Integrative info −0.053 0.099 0.011 0.041 0.147 −0.103 0.139 0.163
Distributive info −0.135 0.013 −0.113 −0.084 0.081 0.201* 0.146 0.052
*** p < 0.1%, ** p < 1%, * p < 5%
and here the significant correlations contradict the direction expected in H3a, we find
a positive relationship between integrative information and activation.
Correlation does not imply a causal relationship. Causal relationships between emo-
tions and communication could work in both directions: Receiving communication
which claims value could lead to negative emotions, and negotiators expressing neg-
ative emotions could be more likely to claim value. To disentangle these effects, we
calculated the correlations between the emotions of one party, and the communica-
tion behavior of the same party as well as the opponent as shown in Table 6. While
effects are significant for both parties, the correlation is stronger within the same party
than with the opponent’s communication. This makes an influence of emotions on
communication more plausible than vice versa.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
In the present paper, we have studied the relationships of different dimensions of
negotiation processes. Our hypotheses predicted consistent patterns across the three
dimensions: According toH3a, lower activation and positive emotions are related to an
integrative orientation in communication—integrative information and creating value.
At the substantive level, they are accompanied by offers which provide higher joint
utility and lower utility imbalance—H1a and H2a. In contrast, we expected activation
and negative emotions to be related to a distributive orientation in communication—
H3b—, lower joint utility and higher imbalance—H1b and H2b.
Concerning H1, we found only weak evidence for the postulated effects of value
creating behavior, which did not occur consistently throughout the negotiations. The
relationships between other communication categories and the substantive dimensions
were even weaker, and mostly could not be confirmed at all. Thus our results provide
only weak support for H1.
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Results concerning H2 about the relationships between emotion and substantive
behavior also could not support our hypothesis. Therewere only fewweakly significant
correlation coefficients, thus we find no evidence for a close relationship between
emotions and substantive behavior in negotiations.
In contrast to these negative results concerning H1 and H2, results for H3 provide
support for the hypothesis linking emotions and communication behavior. In particular,
we find strong evidence for the relation of valence and the strategic action dimension
of communication—i.e. creating and claiming value. For the remainder of H3, we find
weak support in our results.
The relation between emotions and strategic action confirms literature showing that
emotions communicate “social intentions, desired courses of actions, and role-related
expectations and behaviors” (Morris andKeltner 2000, p. 13). Emotions put other com-
munication into context by serving as additional positive or negative signals. A study
by Oetzel et al. (2000) showed that emotional expressions form part of mutual inte-
grating as well as self-centered dominating behaviors. Investigating online disputes,
Brett et al. (2007) showed that acts of attacking face are accompanied by negative
emotions and commands, and acts of giving face are connected to positive emotions.
Other findings indicate that resoluteness is associated with expressions of anger (e.g.,
Kopelman et al. 2006), or that cooperative behaviors are associated with expressions
of happiness (e.g., Stouten and Cremer 2010). Utilizing a computer-mediated negoti-
ation simulation, Pietroni et al. (2008) further found an interrelation between positive
emotions and the reduction of fixed-pie perceptions, that is, an increase in integrative
behaviors—and the inverse effect for negative emotions—, in particular when an issue
was of high importance to a negotiator. Our results add to this research in finding that
communication is enriched or supported by emotional expressions: Emotions can help
to highlight the strategic action dimension of communication and, consequently, make
it more salient. Additionally, the co-variation of positive emotions and value-creation,
as well as of negative emotions and value-claiming, implies that negotiators adopt
emotionally congruent communications (cf. Forgas 1998).
Summarizing the results with respect to our three hypotheses, we thus have to
conclude that substantive behavior on the one hand, and communication and emotions
on the other hand, seem to form quite distinct parts of the negotiation process. At least
the results of this study do not indicate the presence of strong relationships between
them.
However, we think it would be misleading to conclude from this result that com-
munication in negotiations and emotions are “cheap talk”, which has no impact on
the “real” outcome of the negotiation. There are still significant differences between
successful and failed negotiations in the communication and emotional dimensions.
Ignoring these dimensions thus would mean ignoring the risk that negotiations could
not reach an agreement at all.
In discussing the implications of our results, one also has to be aware of the lim-
itations of our study. It is based on a student sample, which raises some questions
of generalizability. Furthermore, we only used one case, which was quite complex
and was specifically designed to induce a rather high level of conflict. Thus, the rela-
tionships between dimensions in more integrative negotiations might be different.
Furthermore, our analysis is based on negotiations conducted via a specific NSS.
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Although the study on which our data is based (Gettinger et al. 2012) utilized different
treatments in which different features of the system were enabled or disabled, the
overall characteristics of the system still remained constant and might have influenced
behavior.
Thus, our present analysis is only a first step toward exploring the relationships of
the different dimensions of negotiation processes in wider contexts. Future research
should also apply multivariate techniques to analyze the relationships and interactions
between the dimensions of the negotiation process simultaneously. The SIPA method
proved to provide a useful framework to establish a common process representation
not only across different negotiations of a study but also across dimensions. More
elaborate analysis methods can then be used to provide a clearer picture of negotiation
processes. In particular, consistency between the substantive, the communication and
the emotional dimensions could be another important factor leading to success or
failure of negotiations and deserves consideration in future research.
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